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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
VIOLA VOGLE WILSON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-v.-

Case No. 8434

MARCEL FELIX WILSON,
Defendant and Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACT
This case came on for trial on September 16, 1955,
before the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, one of the judges of
the Second Judicial District Court, sitting at Farmington,
Utah.
The facts are as follows: Plaintiff and defendant were
married March 5, 1940. At the time of marriage plaintiff
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was approximately 30 years of age and defendant 24 years
of age. They had been married approximately 15 years.
Hence, at the time of the divorce hearing plaintiff was 45
years old and defendant 39 years old. (R. 2, 12, 20.)
Prior to the marriage plaintiff had been employed as a
saleslady in a shoe store in Salt Lake City for approximately
10 years. (R. 12) Plaintiff was not, however, employed outside of her duties as a housewife during any period of her
married life and as far as the record discloses did not contribute any money or property in the acquisition of any of
the assets accumulated by the parties during the marriage. (R.
12)
Except for a few weeks when plaintiff and defendant
were first married and lived with plaintiffs parents, defendant has supported and maintained plaintiff, and all of the
assets accumulated during their marriage were purchased
with money earned by defendant. (R 12, 18, 21, 23, 24, 25,
26,30,35)
At the time of the separation of the parties and at the filing of the complaint for divorce, plaintiff and defendant
had accumulated the following property:
I. Home in Bountiful purchased for $15,950.00. The
fair market value of said home at the time of divorce was between nineteen and twenty thousand dollars. Subsequent to
the signing of the decree of divorce plaintiff sold said
property for a figure in excess of nineteen thousand dollars.
There was a mortgage on said home as of August, 1955, in
the sum of $9,352.74 (R. 13, 10, 50, Exh. g)

2. A home in Salt Lake purchased for $2,700.00 and
fully paid for at the time of the divorce hearing. The fair
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market value of said home is between four and five thousand
dollars. ( R. 13, 50)
3. Furniture and furnishings in the Bountiful home of a
value of four thousand dollars. (R. 13)
4. Furniture in the Salt Lake home. The record discloses
no estimate as to its value. Plaintiff testified that said Salt
Lake home was "partly furnished." (R. 3)
5. Uranium stock which was sold prior to the divorce
hearing for $545.90. (R. 10)
6. A joint hank account at Continental National Bank
in the sum of $827.39, which plaintiff upon the filing of the
divorce complaint immediately withdrew from said joint
account and placed in an account in her own name in Walker
Bank & Trust Company. (See Exh. A, R. 16)

7. Tax refund check in the sum of $161.10. (R. 3)
8. 1946 Oldsmobile of a value of $,95.00. (R. 50)
Defendant, although not permanently employed at the
time of divorce, is capable of earning from his labor an average of $250.00 to $300.00 per month. (R. 55, 56. See also
Findings of Fact R. 29)
Defendant does not contest the ruling of the court with
respect to the granting of the divorce to plaintiff. The record discloses that defendant asked plaintiff to secure a divorce
for the reason that he was in love with another woman and
desired to marry her. Plaintiff established sufficient grounds
for divorce.
Defendant at the time of the divorce hearing was receiving from the U. S. Government, as a result of a service con-
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nected disability-loss of hearing-$173.00 per month.
(R. 52)
Plaintiff was unemployed at the time of the hearing and
stated she was under the care of Dr. Earl Skidmore. She
states that the last time she saw Dr. Skidmore was "last
Monday." (R. 11) Plaintiff did not state what her physical
defect was, but did state that she was physically unable to
work right then. ( R. 11) She further stated that she had
no further appointments to see Dr. Skidmore, but would
probably go to him frequently. ( R. 11, 12) As to the
purpose of plaintiff's visit "last Monday" to Dr. Skidmore,
apparently said visit was to determine whether plaintiff
could have children or not. Plaintiff stated at R. 33: "A. As
of last Af.onday the doctor said he could see no reason why
I haven't been able to have children." Apparently a great
deal of the parties marital difficulties stem from the fact they
had had no children, although both obviously had a desire for
children. ( R. 28, 33, 34) It is defendant's understanding
that plaintiff is gainfully employed at the present time.
The court awarded to plaintiff the following:
1. The Bountiful home.
2. The Salt Lake home.
3. The furniture, furnishings and appliances located in
both homes.
4. The $827.89 account in Walker Bank, which includes
in addition to the $827.89, the tax refund in the sum of
$161.10 which plaintiff, prior to the divorce hearing, de·
posited in the Walker account in her name, or a total of
$,988.99.
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5. In addition to the above, the lower court gave plaintiff
judgment against defendant in the sum of $5,000.00, payable at the rate of $50.00 or more per month. The court
stated in the Decree R. 33: "said sum is ordered paid by
defendant in any and all events as in the case of alimony,
except that said sum is intended as a portion of the allocation of property to plaintiff and shall not be subjected to
future modification by reason of any change of circumstances of the parties, and shall be a charge upon the estate of
the defendant as to any balance that should remain should
he die prior to the full payment thereof."
In addition to the above mentioned property, the court
states in the Findings of Fact, with reference to the property
accumulated during the marriage: R. 29. "A 1946 Oldsmobile and personal effects belonging to the defendant, including fishing gear, carpenter tools and four pieces of
beauty shop equipment (3 chairs and hair dryer)." Other
than the 1946 Oldsmobile, said other property-"fishing
gear, carpenter tools and four pieces of beauty shop equipment ( 3 chairs and hair dryer)" are not mentioned in the
record as property accumulated by the parties. Further the
court did not see fit to award the property to either party in
the decree of divorce. Presumably the court felt the defendant was entitled to the same as it is still in defendant's posession. Since this property was incorporated in the Findings
of Fact somewhat extraneously, the court should not be
offended if defendant states that said property, including
the 1946 Oldsmobile automobile, could be readily duplicated
for less than $250.00, even though such valuation appraisal does not appear in the record. It is certain that the
personal effects of plaintiff, including her wedding and
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engagement rings and miscellaneous }ewelry, would be comparable in value to the above items.
The sum of money, $545.90, received from the sale of
the uranium stock was used to pay $250.00 to plaintiff's
attorney (he had already received $100.00 previously from
plaintiff), $14.80 costs of court, and $281.10 to defendant's
attorney. See letter of defendant's attorney to court dated
September 26, 1955-R. 27.
It is upon this record that defendant seeks the aid of
this court. Defendant asks relief from the oppressive judgment which has been rendered against him, depriving him of
all the assets acquired during 15 years of married life, and
saddling him with a $5,000.00 judgment payable as alimony
at the rate of $50.00 per month.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A TRIAL
DE NOVO AND A JUDGMENT FROM THE SUPREME
COURT BASED UPON THE RECORD PRODUCED IN
THE LOWER COURT.
POINT II. THE LOWER COURT GROSSLY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING THE AWARD OF ALIMONY AND DIVISON OF MARITAL PROPERTY
WHEREBY DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF ALL THE
ASSETS ACCUMULATED DURING MARRIAGE AND, IN
ADDITION, ORDERED TO PAY FIFTY DOLLARS PER
MONTH FOR A TOTAL OF ONE HUNDRED MONTHS.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO A TRIAL
DE NOVO AND A JUDGMENT FROM THE SUPREME
COURT BASED UPON THE RECORD PRODUCED IN
THE LOWER COURT.
It is well settled law, by this court, that where the propriety of an alimony or property distribution in a decree
of divorce is raised on appeal, this court will review the evidence in the nature of a trial de novo and appellant is
entitled to the judgment of the Supreme Court as well as the
trial court on this question. See Hendricks v. Hendricks, 91
Utah 553, 63 P 2d 277, also Foreman v. Foreman, Ill
Utah 72, 176 P 2d 144, and cases cited therein.

POINT II. THE LOWER COURT GROSSLY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN MAKING THE AWARD OF ALIMONY AND DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
WHEREBY DEFENDANT WAS DEPRIVED OF ALL THE
ASSETS ACCUMULATED DURING MARRIAGE AND, IN
ADDITION, ORDERED TO PAY FIFTY DOLLARS PER
~10NTH FOR A TOTAL OF ONE HUNDRED MONTHS.
Counsel for defendant have searched the Utah cases without success to find something comparable to the case at bar
which would justify the lower court in rendering the decision
that it did. It is defendant's contention that the lower court
grossly abused its discretion in making its decision.
This court has held on many occasions that the ruling
of the lower court will not be upset unless it is shown
there was an abuse of discretion. In the instant case the
lower court arrived. at an exceedingly unjust result.
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The court at R. 57 of the transcript of the testimony
stated:
"The Court: I've thought this matter over. I think
it's pathetic that the thing hasn't been settled to a greater
extent than it has been between counsel. Of course, there
is an impasse there. There's no question at all but that
the lady is entitled a divorce in this matter on the ground~
of mental cruelty. The thing I'm faced with of course is
the division of the property, deciding what to do about
this property.
"I'm mindful of several things about it. The one thing
I'm most mindful about is what I've termed Amos and
Andy, that is: Big judgments are hard to collect. A
bird in the hand is worth two in the bush in this alimony
business. At the same time I think under the law she is
entitled to a certain amount of alimony because of 15
years. If certain divisions are made, I have in mind
offering this election to the plaintiff: At the same time,
I might say I foresee that this man is about to go into another marriage which is going to mean bitterness, almost
unbearable bitterness, about the payment of alimony and
that kind of thing. It's going to be a real human problem.
I'm sure both counsel appreciate immediately the problems that are going to grow up as the years go by over alimony payment. This is the election: I would like the
plaintiff to make a choice. She may have all of the
property except the check in evidence.
"Mr. Duncan: I didn't get that.
"The Court: She may have all the property except
the check in evidence, and $5,000.00 payable $50.00 a
month for one hundred payments for the next one hundred
months, or she may choose between the two homes and
have $10,000.00 at a hundred dollars a month, payable
in one hundred installments. Please make a choice."
The lower court, from the context of the statement given
above, apparently was attempting to give to plaintiff suffi-
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cient so as to be supported the rest of her life, regardless of
the equities of the situation.
The decisions of this court have compared the dissolution
of marriage by divorce as analogous to its dissolution by
death and a general rule for allowance of alimony is onethird of husbands property or one-third of his income.
Griffin v. Griffin, 18 Utah 98, 55 P 84. Also Bullen v.
Bullen, 71 Utah 63, 262 P 292. But that said amount is
relative and must vary with the facts. Woolley v. Woolley,
113 Utah 391, 195 P 2d 743. For instance where the wife's
health has been affected by the husband's conduct then alimony may be granted. Foreman v. Foreman Ill Utah 72,
176 p 2d 144.
"Effort should be made to place the parties as nearly
as possible in the position they were immediately prior
to the time they established their joint accounts, and
joint ownership in bonds, and if for any reason either
party cannot be placed fully in that status, he or she
should be given credit in the form of a judgment for the
shortage. In consideration of this matter the court should
allow Mrs. Foreman a reasonable sum of money per
month for such length of time as the court believes will
enable her to readjust her life to her former position of
self-support." Foreman v. Foreman, cited supra.
In the case of Pinion v. Pinion, 92 Utah 255, 67 P 2d
265, and followed specifically by this court in Anderson v.
Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 P 252, Justice Wolfe lists
nine factors or elements to be given consideration by the
court in awarding alimony and in settling property rights.
They are as follows:

I. What wer-e the ages of the parties when married?
Plaintiff was 30, defendant 24.
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2. What Is the duration of the marriage. In this case
15 years.
3. What did the parties surrender or give up by marriage?
Plaintiff gave up a job as a saleslady in a shoe store. In
return she has been supported and maintained during the
15 years of married life. True she did not live in luxury,
but as stated by plaintiff: "A. No, Mr. Gustin, we were never
in a position that we were worried about money." Indeed,
the wages of defendant were such that by his earnings alone
they accumulated marital assets with a net value in excess
of twenty thousand dollars. From all indications she lived
better than she did prior to the marriage.
4. What property, if any, the parties contributed by marriage? Neither party entered into the marriage with any
previous acquired property or money. Plaintiff was not
employed outside of the home during marriage. Everything
that the parties had at the time of divorce was gained by the
parties during their married life from the money earned by
defendant.
5. What amount of property was held by the parties at
the time of divorce? All of the property of the parties was
held jointly except the 1946 Oldsmobile, which was in de·
fend ant's name alone. The joint bank account was originally
in the parties joint name, but was withdrawn by plaintiff and
put in her own name.
6. What is the ability and opportunity of each party to
earn money? Defendant is 39 and has a trade as a hair
dresser, which he can pursue. Defendant's earnings from said
trade, as shown by the record, will yield him about $250.00
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or $300.00 per month. There is also a good possibility that
defendant can continue his trade for some years to come.
Plaintiff has not worked for 15 years. The last job she
held as a saleslady lasted for ten years up to the time of marriage. Accordingly it will be more difficult for plaintiff
to secure employment than defendant, but she is not entirely
incapacitated from working. Plaintiff testified that she
was under the care of Dr. Earl Skidmore and was physically
unable to work. However, she does not disclose the nature of
her physical disability. The last time she claims she saw the
doctor prior to the hearing was for the purpose of determining
whether or not she could have children. Further defendant
understands plaintiff is working at the present time, which is
good indication that plaintiff can, if she will, contribute to her
own support.
7. What are the financial conditions and necessities of
each party, including abilities to save and care for earnings?
The parties from their testimony have always lived within
their means, regardless of how much def.endant earned. Defendant's first job as a cab driver paid him $80.00 to
$100.00 per month. While defendant was in the army, the
parties lived on defendant's allotment of $90.00 per month,
plus earnings they had saved from defendant's prior earnings.
It is obvious that the parties can manage their funds well
and have done so right up to the time of the divorce, as is
shown by their ability to accumulate the amount of property
they have. The record shows that during the five and onehalf months between the time the divorce was filed and the
trial (R 7) that plaintiff spent on an average of $163.21
per month, which includes a payment of $90.13 per month
on the Bountiful house mortgage and a $100.00 payment to
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her ·attorney during that time. The cancelled checks and
bank statements (See Plaintiff's Exhibit A) further show
that during said period of time plaintiff was purchasing
clothes, shoes, etc., apparently as her needs arose, and taking
care of her house, utilities, groceries, etc.
Defendant's financial needs are not set forth in dollars
and cents. He testified that he intended marrying, therefore,
his expenses would be more than plaintiff's.
8. What is the health of the parties?
9. What is the standard or mode of living of the
parties?
Both the factors 8 and 9 have been discussed above and
further comment is not necessary.
It is impossible to conceive how the lower court could
maintain it had arrived at a just decision, unless the court
felt that defendant should be punished as the guilty party
to the divorce. Of necessity, under our law and the decisions
of this court, there must be a guilty party to every divorce,
otherwise a decree could not be granted. However, this alone
would not justify the court in exacting the proverbial "pound
of flesh" in attempting to equalize the matter.
The court in the Foreman case cited supra, criticized the
trial court for just that thing:
"It would seem from a r·eading of the above statement
that what the court was attempting to do here was to
compensate Mrs. Foreman for her suffering of the pangs
of unrequited love-heart balm-and teach Mr. Foreman
a lesson in marriage. Neither task is properly within the
issues of a divorce case such as this."
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Every item of marital property, except a 1946 Oldsmobile automobile of a value of $95.00, the court awarded to
plaintiff. Approximately $120,000.00 in property was given
to plaintiff and, in addition, a $5,ooo~oo award of "nonmodifiable" ·alimony is given to plaintiff to .be paid in all
events, even after death from his estate. Such cannot be the
law of the State of Utah.

CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully requests that this court reconsider
the evidence presented in this case and make an equitable
distribution of the marital property.
Respectfully submitted,
McCULLOUGH, BOYCE & McCULLOUGH
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
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